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Social Security 
Ronald Lee and Shripad Tuljapurkar 
Population aging is projected to have a major impact on the federal budget in 
the next century, in part through its effects on health costs through Medicare 
and Medicaid, and in part through its effect on the retirement system. Despite 
the inevitability of the aging of the baby boom, and its dramatic effect on the 
old age dependency ratio, a great deal of uncertainty remains about the extent 
of  future population aging. On the one hand, we do not know how rapidly 
mortality  will decline and how long people will be living, and on the other 
hand, we do not know what fertility will be, and therefore we do not know how 
large the labor force will be in the future. Immigration adds another layer of 
uncertainty, but we do not consider it in this paper. In addition to these demo- 
graphic sources of uncertainty, there  are economic variables  with important 
effects on the future finances of the social security system, notably the rate of 
growth of  productivity or real  wages and the level of  the real  interest rate. 
Rational planning for the next century must somehow take into account not 
just our best guesses about the future but also our best assessments of the un- 
certainty surrounding these guesses. 
Scenario-based forecasts are widely used to express the uncertainty of long- 
term forecasts. In these, the forecaster chooses, for each variable, a medium or 
best-guess trajectory, as well as high and low trajectories.  Then one of these 
trajectories for each variable is grouped with others in a scenario, or collection 
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of trajectories. These scenarios may, in turn, be described as “high,” “medium,” 
or “low,” or by  other terms such as “optimistic”  and “pessimistic.” A  high 
scenario would typically  be based on a high  trajectory for fertility  and  net 
immigration and a low trajectory for mortality; this combination would yield 
high population growth. Alternatively, a “low cost” scenario for social security 
would bundle together high fertility and net immigration with high, rather than 
low, mortality; this  scenario would generate the lowest old age dependency 
ratio.  For the  social  security  forecast,  this  low-cost  demographic  scenario 
would then be combined  with high trajectories for productivity  growth and 
(perhaps) for interest rates. 
The scenario-based approach has  several features worth noting. First, no 
probability is assigned to any of the trajectories or to the range that they cover, 
or to a scenario. Second, the trajectories are always high, or always low, or 
always middle; this means that fluctuations and structural shifts are assumed 
away. Third, the combinations of trajectories in scenarios are fixed to produce 
extreme outcomes. If  there is some probability that fertility  will follow  the 
high trajectory, that must be higher than the probability that mortality will si- 
multaneously  follow  its  low  trajectory;  and  that joint probability  must  be 
greater than the probability  that productivity growth will simultaneously fol- 
low its high trajectory. Thus, even if  we could attach some rough probability 
to the individual trajectories, we would have no clear way to attach probabili- 
ties to their combination. Fourth, any effort to attach probabilities to trajector- 
ies or to scenario outcomes would have to ignore many internal contradictions. 
For example, uncertainty about fertility is compounded by  uncertainty  about 
numbers of reproductive age women, but much of this uncertainty may cancel 
when it is transformed into uncertainty about numbers of annual births. Some 
uncertainty about annual births will cancel when it is summed into uncertainty 
about age group sizes or total population sizes. When demographic uncertainty 
is added to uncertainty from other sources, further cancellation should take 
place. Uncertainty is not additive in the way that it is assumed to be in scenario- 
based forecasts. These problems with the usual approach are very serious and 
have potentially  serious consequences for planning and policy formation. 
In this paper, we build on earlier work (Lee and Carter 1992; Lee 1993; Lee 
and Tuljapurkar  1994; Tuljapurkar and Lee, in press) to develop  stochastic 
forecasts  of  the  social  security  trust  fund  (assuming  currently  legislated 
changes in taxes and benefits), of summary actuarial balances, and of the “pay 
as you go” (PAYGO) payroll tax rate. These forecasts are based on stochastic 
models for fertility, mortality, productivity growth, and interest rates,  which 
are fitted on historical data. For interest rates and productivity growth, the fitted 
models are constrained to conform in long-run expected value to the middle 
assumptions of the Social Security Administration (SSA; see Board of Trustees 
1995). We have not attempted to build a simulation model for social security 
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to build a simple model that captures the core features of social security, and 
that can reproduce the social security forecasts when run with SSA specifica- 
tions. 
The Lee-Tuljapurkar ( 1994) stochastic population forecasts were used by 
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in its 1996 and 1997 reports to gener- 
ate stochastic forecasts of the federal budget over the long term (CBO 1996). 
For an alternative approach to generating stochastic forecasts of social security 
finances, see Holmer (1995a, 1995b). 
9.1  Forecasts of Fertility and Mortality 
The evolution of the population depends on fertility, mortality, and net mi- 
gration. In  this analysis, we take fertility and mortality to be stochastic but 
have taken net migration to be fixed at the future levels assumed by the SSA. 
According to the sensitivity analysis done by the SSA (see Board of Trustees 
1995,32-42),  in 2070 the effect on projected actuarial balance of the range of 
migration assumptions is only one-third as great as the effect of  the fertility 
range, and only one-fifth as great as the range of the mortality assumptions. 
Because our methods for forecasting fertility and mortality have been de- 
scribed in detail elsewhere (Lee and Carter 1992; Lee 1993), we only sketch 
them here. Both fertility and mortality are fitted by a model of the form 
where mx,,  is fertility of women aged x in year t,  or the logarithm of the central 
death rate for age x in year t;  a,  is an additive age-specific constant, reflecting 
the general shape of the age schedule; k, is a period-specific index of the gen- 
eral level of fertility or mortality; bx indicates the responsiveness of fertility or 
mortality at age x to variations in the general level; and q1  is the error in this 
approximation to the actual age schedule. There are some important issues in 
the estimation of this model, but they will not be discussed here. The key for 
forecasting is the period index, k. This is modeled as a stochastic time-series 
process, and the model is fitted to historical data. In the stochastic demographic 
forecasts, the stochastic model is used either to characterize the probability 
distributions for future fertility and mortality in analytic work or to generate 
sample paths for fertility and mortality through stochastic simulation. In either 
case, the coefficients ax  and b, are then used to generate the age schedules for 
each r. In the case of fertility, it is necessary to constrain the model based on 
outside information; otherwise, the long-run behavior of the forecast is unsatis- 
factory, for reasons discussed later (see Lee 1993). The simplest and most satis- 
factory approach has been to constrain the long-term expected value of the 
fertility process to equal a specified level, such as 2.1 for the total fertility rate 
(TFR).  Then the model conveys information about the variance and autocovari- 
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9.2  Forecasts of Productivity Growth and Interest Rates 
The finances of the social security system depend not only on demographic 
variables but also on a whole range of economic and health variables: produc- 
tivity growth rates, interest rates, inflation, disability uptake rates, and disabil- 
ity departure rates, to name only the ones for which the SSA performs a sensi- 
tivity analysis. From this list, we have chosen to focus on productivity growth 
rates and real interest rates. This choice is based partly on the sensitivity analy- 
sis reported in Board of Trustees (1995) and partly on the conceptual centrality 
of these variables for the retirement system. 
Our analysis treats fertility, mortality, productivity growth, and the interest 
rate as stochastic. In addition to these four factors, the SSA performs sensitiv- 
ity tests on assumptions about net  migration, the rate of  inflation, disability 
incidence, and disability termination. Analysis of the SSA projections and sen- 
sitivity tests (Board of Trustees 1995) indicates that the four variables we treat 
as stochastic account for 63, 70, and 76 percent of the width of the SSA low- 
cost-high-cost  range in 2020, 2045, and 2070, respectively. ' 
In a pure PAYGO system, the interest rate would be irrelevant. However, the 
U.S. system has become partially funded, and interest on its growing reserve 
fund is an important inflow to the system.  Also, in forecasts that imply negative 
reserve fund balances, it is appropriate to incorporate the cost of  borrowing to 
cover the deficit. 
Retirees receive benefits based on their earnings histories. When productiv- 
ity growth  is rapid,  these histories  are on average much  lower than are the 
wages of the current workers. For this reason, rapid  productivity growth re- 
duces the tax rate necessary to fund the benefits of current retirees. The average 
age of receiving benefits is estimated to be 71 years old around 1990, whereas 
the level of benefits of a cohort is set by the level of the real wage when the 
cohort turns 60 years old. This 11-year age difference leverages the effects of 
changes in the rate of productivity growth. 
Productivity growth and interest rates are economic variables that could be 
forecast in some highly structured way, based on the marginal products of labor 
and capital in an aggregate production function, with labor supply driven by 
the demographic forecasts, and with capital accumulation depending in part 
on savings behavior that might in turn be driven by  our forecasts of  demo- 
graphic change, drawing on either life cycle saving theory or estimated age 
profiles of saving and dissaving. Such an approach could certainly be imple- 
mented. However, demographic  change has shown limited power to explain 
saving rate variations in the past (see Aaron, Bosworth, and Burtless  1989); 
domestic saving does not explain all variations in capital accumulation, due in 
part to international capital flows, nor does the capital-labor ratio explain all 
1. These are calculated from ranges in the sensitivity tests reported in Board of Trustees (1995, 
132-42) and are for the summary actuarial balance. The total range when all vary is very close to 
the sum of the individual ranges when one vanes and all others are held at their middle values. 397  Stochastic Forecasts for Social Security 
variation in real interest rates; the capital-labor ratio is only one influence on 
labor  productivity;  technological  progress  is  a  great unknown;  and  on the 
whole, we have little confidence that such a structured approach would actually 
be very useful. Instead, we will simply model productivity growth and interest 
rates as single time series, without attempting to relate them to the economic 
structure believed to generate them. Provided that the trust fund does not be- 
come too large in absolute value relative to GNP, our no-feedback assumption 
may not be too bad. In principle we could model and forecast them as jointly 
evolving  (e.g., VAR  or cointegrated  processes),  but  our empirical  analysis 
turned up surprisingly little evidence that they were associated. 
Productivity  was measured as output per worker-hour, from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. This measure has a longer available time series than the alter- 
natives, although there are sometimes fairly substantial differences between its 
rate of change and that of the social security covered wage series. In modeling 
productivity growth, we take into account the effect of changing age composi- 
tion of the labor force on aggregate wages or productivity. The cross-sectional 
age profile of wages has a characteristic inverted U shape, peaking in the late 
40s. This means that when there are disproportionately many young workers, 
for example, as in the 1970s and 1980s, there is downward pressure on aggre- 
gate wage levels or productivity per worker, arising purely from the composi- 
tional effect. We purged our productivity growth measure of  age composition 
effects by  dividing it by the summed age-by-age products of the average age 
profile of earnings times the year-specific proportional age-sex composition of 
the labor force.* Figure 9.1 shows the real productivity growth rate series from 
1948 to 1994 (line)  and the growth rate series with adjustment for demographic 
composition effects (diamonds).  Demographic adjustment typically alters the 
growth rate by  less than  ?.5 percent. In addition, there may be a twist in the 
age distribution of earnings due to the well-known cohort size effect. However, 
we view this as a second-order effect and do not try to incorporate it. 
Statistical  time-series  methods  are not  intended  for  long-term  forecasts. 
Their purpose  is instead to fit a highly  simplified  and  parsimonious  linear 
model with very short memory, which will mimic the behavior of the true gen- 
erating process for a few steps into the future. Standard diagnostic and model- 
ing procedures typically indicate that one should at least first-difference  the 
time series before fitting it as an ARMA process. The first-differencing means 
that  the  original process  is modeled  as some  sort of  random  walk,  with  a 
2.  The average wage profile by age and sex was calculated from the 1990 March Current Popula- 
tion Survey (CPS) supplement. The data on age-sex composition of the labor force are also taken 
from the CPS for 1948-94.  If N(i,j,t) is the number in the labor force for age category i, sex j,  and 
year t, and the average wage from the 1990 CPS is W(ij),  then the index Z(t) is 
The productivity series is then divided by  Z(t) to remove the effects of changing age-sex composi- 
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Fig. 9.1  Rate of productivity growth, with and without demographic 
adjustment, 1948-94 
Note: Productivity is measured as output per worker-hour. Demographic adjustment removes the 
influence of  the changing age-sex composition of  the labor force, using the average age-sex eam- 
ings schedule over the period. 
complicated innovation term and with drift. This often works well for short- 
run forecasts. For long-run forecasts, however, the drift (arising from any con- 
stant term in the differenced process) may lead to absurd levels at the same 
time that the random walk (or integrated) nature of the model leads to huge 
variances. For these reasons, long-term forecasts from these models can often 
be rejected as absurd. For example, in one of our fitted models, the forecast of 
the productivity growth rate for the year 2070 was 20 percent per year, plus or 
minus 60 percent. 
The  standard  diagnostic  and  modeling  procedures  go  quickly  to  first- 
differencing because it is simple, not because the data indicate that the process 
is truly a random walk. An alternative autoregressive model may fit just as well 
yet behave entirely differently  in the long run, with no long-term  trend  and 
much smaller variance, relative to the integrated  process. There is often  too 
little information in the historical data to indicate which model is more correct. 
It may be necessary to turn to outside information, which is the route we take 
here.3 
For some of our series, there is an additional problem: the consensus view 
3. The level of  productivity, of  course, has a very  strong trend and must be  differenced (after 
talung the logarithm) to obtain the rate of  productivity growth. The discussion in this section ad- 
dresses the question of  whether the rate of productivity growth should then be differenced once 
more, before modeling. 399  Stochastic Forecasts for Social Security 
is that there have been structural changes in recent years such that the means 
of the fertility, productivity, and interest rate series will be different from the 
average of their past values. We initially attempted to deal with these purported 
structural changes formally, by fitting state space models with random trends 
(Harvey  1989). These efforts did not lead to plausible forecasts. After much 
experimentation,  we found that apparently satisfactory models and forecasts 
were obtained by prespecifying the long-term means of the series, rather than 
estimating them from the data. In particular, we chose the long-term means of 
the real productivity growth and real interest rate series to equal the middle 
values assumed by the SSA: 1 percent per year and 2.3 percent, respectively. 
For better or for worse, this guarantees that the expected values of the forecasts 
will converge to the prespecified values, insuring consistency  with the SSA 
middle scenarios. Since we wish to focus on the uncertainty rather than on the 
mean values, this feature is acceptable. Furthermore, with constrained means 
and an autoregressive (rather than differenced)  specification, the probability 
bands for the forecasts of these rates appear very plausible,  as we shall see 
below. 
The trust fund for social security is held in special government securities, 
described as follows: “By law, the securities issued to Social Security for in- 
vestment of the reserve fund bear an interest rate equal to the average yield, as 
of the last day of the prior month, on all outstanding Federal securities that are 
not due to mature for at least four years” (Foster 1994, 21).  We constructed a 
historical interest rate series using the interest rate series for this special issue 
from 1961 to the present. Before 1961, social security interest rates were gov- 
erned by  different policies. Ideally, we would have constructed an equivalent 
measure for the period before  1961, since it would be most informative for 
forecasting purposes, whether or not it was actually the rate earned during the 
earlier period. In practice, having experimented with weighted averages of the 
three-month Treasury bill rate and the 10-year rate for best fit after 1961, we 
settled on using a within-sample regression fitted to predict the pre-1961 spe- 
cial issue rate from the simple three-month rate (bank discount basis). A Chow 
test accepted the null hypothesis that models fitted separately to the pre- and 
post-1961 data were the same. To convert these nominal interest rates into real 
rates, we used the Consumer Price Index for Urban Consumers (CPI-U). 
As discussed earlier, we experimented with standard ARIMA models, ran- 
dom trend (structural time series) models, and ARMA constrained mean mod- 
els (ARMA-CM), and chose the ARMA-CM models for the preferred  esti- 
mates. To fit these models, one simply subtracts the constrained mean from the 
variable to  be modeled and then fits an ARMA model in the usual way, but 
with no constant term. 
The fitted model for productivity  growth rate (PGR) is as follows: 
PGR, - .01 = .607(PGR,_, - .01)  + E,, 
a,  = .021,  R’  =  SO. 400  Ronald Lee and Shripad 'hljapurkar 
The fitted model for the real interest rate (I)  is as follows: 
Z, - .023  =  .735(Z,+, - .023) + u,: 
uv = ,018,  R2 = .17. 
A standard ARIMA model leads to a long-term productivity growth rate fore- 
cast of .0210 for the raw series and .0225 for the series that was adjusted for 
age-sex structure, with 95 percent probability intervals 2.065 and  ?.072,  re- 
spectively. Our Kalman filter estimates of a random trend model yielded mean 
growth rates of about .016, with an interval of 2.16. In both cases, the conven- 
tional mean forecast remains substantially higher than the social security mean 
forecast, and higher than many analysts would view as plausible. Additionally, 
the interval width for the Kalman filter estimate is greater than we find reason- 
able. The social security forecasts, as well as many analysts, assume that the 
productivity  growth rate has undergone  a structural decline to  1 percent per 
year. We therefore took this as the mean for our ARMA-CM models. These 
have  mean  productivity  growth rates of  .01, by  assumption, with  empirical 
interval ranges of  .09 and .09, re~pectively.~  Note that  estimated errors  are 
greater when there is no constant in the fitted model, leading to wider intervals 
than in the conventional models. Figure 9.2 shows the historical series of cor- 
rected growth rates together with the model forecast and 95 percent probabil- 
ity bands. 
The SSA uses a productivity growth rate range of .005 to .015 per year, for 
an interval width of .01, only one-ninth as wide a range as in our preferred 
model, the ARMA-CM. But it is very important to realize that these intervals 
are not comparable. The SSA interval is intended to bracket  some notion of 
the long-term tendency in the rate, while ours is intended to bracket year-to- 
year fluctuations. Over the time period  1948-94,  the rate of real productivity 
growth had a high of more than 8 percent per year and a low of almost negative 
2 percent, for a range of about 10 percent. This compares quite closely to the 
interval width of 9 percent estimated by the models5 and obviously far exceeds 
the range assumed in the SSA forecast. For purposes of comparison, we also 
calculated the 95 percent probability interval for the average value of the pro- 
ductivity  growth rate up to 2070. Instead of  having a width  of  .09, it has a 
width of .0244, only about a quarter as great. It is narrower because a great deal 
of the year-to-year variation cancels out in the average. Note that the greater the 
positive autocorrelation, the less cancellation there will be, and the more simi- 
lar will be the averaged and unaveraged brackets. 
The SSA forecasts a real interest rate of  .023, with a range of .015 to .030. 
Our ARIMA forecasts (actually a simple 1,0,0  model was chosen) have a long- 
4. I.e., the difference  between the upper and lower 95 percent bounds is .09. 
5.  We  would expect to encounter a value at least as great as the 95 percent upper bound about 
once in a realization as long as 1948-94,  and the same for the lower bound: each should be attained 
by  about 2.5 percent, or one-fortieth, of  the observations. 401  Stochastic Forecasts for Social Security 
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Fig. 9.2  Demographically adjusted productivity growth rates, actual and 
forecasted, with 95 percent probability interval, 1948-2070 
Note: The long-term rate of  productivity growth has been constrained to be  1 percent annually. 
See text for details. 
run mean of ,022, close to that of the SSA, with an interval width of about .12. 
The ARMA-CM estimates, with a constrained mean of .023 to match the SSA, 
also have an interval width of .12. These interval widths are very large, but the 
maximum-minimum range in the data series from 1948 to 1994 is even wider 
at  15 percent. As before,  it is useful  to calculate  the interval width for the 
cumulative average values in 2070, and these are far narrower, at .045, or about 
a third the width. Figure 9.3 shows the historical series, the forecast, and the 
95 percent probability interval for the special issue real interest rate. 
The upshot, then, is that our preferred forecasts of productivity growth rates 
and interest rates have the same means as the SSA forecasts by assumption and 
are stochastic with 95 percent probability intervals for the cumulative averages 
that are about two and a half or three times as wide as the SSA scenario ranges. 
Like the SSA, we find forecasts of the real interest rate to be considerably more 
uncertain than those of the productivity growth rate. 
9.3  The Tax and Benefit Schedules 
The age schedules of payroll  tax  payments and receipt of benefits,  when 
multiplied times the forecasted population age distribution and summed, deter- 
mine the main flows into and out of the system. It is important to give careful 
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Fig. 9.3  Real interest rate, actual and forecasted, with 95 percent probability 
interval, 1948-2070 
Note: Interest rate is for the special Treasury issue for social security from  1961 to  1994, with 
estimated values before  1961. It is deflated by  CPI-U. The long-term real interest rate is con- 
strained to be 2.3 percent. See text for details. 
Our starting point will be the average age schedules of  payroll taxes and 
benefits for 1994. For benefits, these are calculated from data in the Annual 
Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin, and for taxes, from the 
March CPS.6 Figure 9.4 plots the age profiles of tax payments per capita for 
males and females. Figure 9.5 plots the corresponding data for receipt of bene- 
fits per capita. In figure 9.5, note the survivor’s benefits received at ages under 
20, and the survivor’s and disability benefits received in growing amounts in 
the decades before the early retirement age of 62 is reached. 
We will take into account the way in which productivity growth will affect 
the level and shape of the tax and benefit schedules. We will also take into 
6.  Data on the OASDI payments made by  the SSA during  1994 are taken from the Annual 
Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin (SSA 1994). Estimates of OASI and DI pay- 
ments by  single year of age and by  sex are generated from these data by assuming a constant per 
capita benefit level within the broad age categories provided in the published tables and allocating 
based on Census Bureau estimates of the 1994 US.  resident population. These sex-age profiles of 
OASI and DI benefits are then adjusted by  a constant factor so that the population-weighted sum 
equals the total benefit paid by OASI and DI as reported in the Annual Statistical Supplement. Data 
on the amount of OASDI taxes paid are derived from estimates of OASDI-taxable income taken 
from the March 1994 CPS. The sex-age profile of OASDI taxes paid is then adjusted by a constant 
factor so that the population-weighted sum equals the total taxes received by the OASI and DI trust 
funds as reported in the SSA’s Annual Statistical Supplement. I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
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Fig. 9.4  Per capita social security tax payments by age and sex, 1994 
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9.5  Per capita social security benefits received by age and sex, 1994 404  Ronald Lee and Shripad Tuljapurkar 
account the effect of planned changes in the normal retirement age on these 
schedules. As mortality declines, there will be fewer survivors to claim bene- 
fits, and compositional effects of widowhood and selectivity (to be discussed 
later) will be reduced. We have not attempted to incorporate these effects of 
mortality decline. There will doubtless be other changes in the level and shape 
of these schedules that will occur over the next 75 years arising from changes 
in labor supply behavior due to causes other than the changes in social security 
regulations,  and  perhaps  also arising from changes  in  the  age structure of 
wages due to the changing age distribution of the labor force (young workers 
becoming less plentiful relative to older workers). There may also be further, 
currently unscheduled, changes in the social security regulations that will af- 
fect taxes and benefits. We have attempted neither to anticipate any of  these 
changes nor to include measures of the uncertainty to which they give rise. 
9.3.1  The Effect of Postponing the Normal Retirement Age 
First consider the effects of  the planned changes in the normal retirement 
age. The early age at retirement will remain at 62, but the age of  retirement 
with full benefits will be raised gradually from age 65 to age 67. Since benefits 
will be reduced in an actuarially fair way for those retiring before age 67, bene- 
fits at age 62 will be lower than they are now, other things equal. In addition, 
it is planned  to make actuarially fair adjustments  to benefits  for those who 
continue working past the normal retirement age, which should lead to some 
additional postponement of retirement. 
A number of econometric studies attempt to assess the effects on retirement 
behavior of these planned changes (e.g., Lumsdaine and Wise 1994; and stud- 
ies reviewed  in Hurd  1990). Most analysts conclude that the effects of the 
planned changes will probably be relatively minor, but there is no consensus 
on details. 
We have taken a mechanical approach to adjusting the age schedules. Our 
procedure is illustrated by the adjustment to benefits for the full two-year shift 
in the normal retirement age. We assume that at age 61, there will be no change 
at all in the tax or benefit schedules. At ages 70 and over, as discussed by the 
SSA, all beneficiaries will have started taking benefits. The levels of taxes and 
benefits that now obtain at ages 62-70  are assumed to shift in a smooth fashion, 
toward a profile in which the benefits at a given age before the shift are ob- 
tained two years later after the shift. At intermediate points, the amount of the 
age shift is interpolated proportionately.’ 
7. More generally, let the size of the shift in the normal retirement age be  Y years (Y  is 2 in the 
above example). Then the final benefit or tax schedule at age x will interpolate between its starting 
value at that age and its starting value at age x + I: with an interpolation factor that depends on 
(x -  62)/(70 -  62) for 62 5  x 5  70. We  assume that the new benefit profile phases out the old 
one evenly over the time period specified under law. The tax profile is adjusted in a similar way  to 
incorporate additional wage-eaming years before the new retirement age. 405  Stochastic Forecasts for Social Security 
9.3.2 
We  assume that the tax cutoff  will be raised  in proportion to the general 
level of wages, so we ignore it except to the extent that it is already reflected 
in the level and shape of  the tax payment  age profile. Thus we assume that 
the age schedule of  taxes shifts upward  proportionately at the same rate as 
productivity grows. These rising age schedules of payroll taxes are applied to 
projected population age distributions, thereby capturing the influence of the 
changing age distribution of the labor force on tax revenues in addition to the 
influence of productivity growth itself. The procedure restores the age compo- 
sition effects that were initially purged from our measure of productivity.8 
The effect of productivity  growth on the benefit schedule is more compli- 
cated to model. The base-year age profile of benefits reflects many factors: 
The Effect of Productivity Growth 
Timing of  retirement, and the way  that the benefit level changes as a 
consequence 
Effect of widowhood and other factors on the proportion of beneficia- 
ries  that are single, since the per capita benefit  is lower for mamed 
couples with only one primary beneficiary 
Effects of productivity change in the past, since more rapid productivity 
growth  reduces  the  benefit  level  of  older  beneficiaries  relative  to 
younger ones 
Selectivity of mortality at higher ages, as those with lower lifetime in- 
comes tend to have shorter lives and lower benefits 
Overgenerous adjustment for inflation led to rapidly rising benefits for 
some cohorts, and disappointment for the notch generations 
We wish to retain the influences of all these factors except the last. In principle 
we should purge the profile of the effects of  the notch generations, since these 
are relevant only for certain cohorts that will die out before many years have 
passed. In practice we have not yet attempted to do so. 
Our approach is to modify  the base-year  benefit  schedule in  such a way 
that it is constantly updated to reflect the changing effects of past and future 
productivity change. For a person retiring at any age who turned 60 in year 
t, benefits  depend  on  the  average of his or her 35 highest annual earnings 
totals,  with  earnings before  age 60  in  year t -  s  multiplied by  the factor 
w(t)lw(r -  s),  where w(t)  refers to economy-wide average wage levels. Because 
of the averaging and adjusting of  wages, it happens that the primary benefit 
amount will depend almost entirely on the average wage level when the cohort 
8. By first purging the measure of age effects, then modeling and forecasting it, and then reintro- 
ducing the effects of age composition change on tax revenues, we achieve two goals. First, we 
derive a measure of  productivity growth that should be more amenable to time-series modeling, 
since once source of long swings has been removed. Second, we obtain a measure that can appro- 
priately be multiplied times the tax age schedule, which would not otherwise be true. 406  Ronald Lee and Shripad Tuljapurkar 
turned age 60, and not on average wage levels in earlier years. To be more 
exact, for someone who retires at age 62, and whose highest earnings were in 
the last 35 of those years, the primary benefit will reflect the sum of (a) wages 
earned in the 33 years through age 59, each year’s wages being inflated to the 
wage levels when the person is 60, and (b) the sum of wages at ages 61 and 62. 
We have developed an algorithm to adjust the shape of the benefit schedule 
to reflect changes in the growth rate of productivity or wages while retaining 
the other important aspects of the shape of  the benefit profile, as catalogued 
earlier. Let B(x, t)  be the  benefit  level  for a person  aged x 5 62 in year 
t 2  1995. We  will define the benefit level for B(x, t)  recursively  in terms of 
the benefit level at the same age in the previous year, B(x, f -  1). These two 
benefit levels will differ because those aged x  in t retired one year later than 
those aged x  in t -  1, and therefore their benefits will be higher by a factor of 
w(t -  (x -  60))/w(t -  1 -  (x -  60)), or by the rate of productivity growth (or 
wage growth) in the year just before they turned age 60. Therefore 
B(x,t + 1) =  {~(t  -  (X - 62) - l)/w(t - 1 -  (X - 62) - 1)) B(x,t). 
This simple equation ignores a term that depends on productivity change be- 
tween ages 60 and 61, but this has very little effect on the results. 
Note that when the rate of productivity growth continues at a constant rate 
that was also the rate of change in the past, then this algorithm simply raises 
the whole age profile by the same multiplicative factor each year. However, 
even if the projected future rate is constant, yet differs from the past constant 
rate, this procedure will change the shape of the benefit profile as time passes, 
as it should. Generally, more rapid productivity growth will tilt the age profile 
downward to the right, so that older people get relatively lower benefits than 
younger retirees. Because in fact productivity growth has recently been slower 
than in the more distant past, and because it is expected to be slower in the 
future as well, the age profile  of benefits will be made to tilt upward  to the 
right, so that older beneficiaries receive relatively higher benefits. 
Figure 9.6 shows the projected age profile of taxes for the years 2005 and 
2045, at which time the normal retirement  age will have been raised by one 
full year and by two full years, respectively.  It, and figure 9.7, are plotted on 
the assumption that productivity growth after 1994 is fixed deterministically at 
1 percent per year. Figure 9.6 therefore reflects the effects of both productivity 
growth and the increase in the normal retirement age. Figure 9.7, which shows 
benefits received by age, is also affected by these factors. Because past produc- 
tivity growth was generally more rapid than 1 percent, the assumed slowdown 
of productivity growth tilts the profiles upward toward the right. But the strik- 
ing increase of benefits with age that is shown in figure 9.7 also reflects compo- 
sitional change. The average real benefit received per surviving member of a 
retirement cohort actually rises with age and time following retirement, be- 
cause survival is selective of those who had higher earnings while working, I 
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Fig. 9.6  Projected social security taxes for males (in 2005 and 2045), reflecting 
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Fig. 9.7  Projected social security benefits received for males (in 2005 and 
2045), reflecting 1 percent productivity growth rate and legislated increases in 
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Fig. 9.8  Projected old age dependency ratios to 2070 with brackets 
Note; SSA brackets are high- and low-cost variants. Stochastic forecast brackets are 95 percent 
probability intervals. 
and because benefits are higher per capita for those living alone than for those 
living as married couples, so that increasing  widowhood raises the average 
benefit. 
9.4  Forecasts of the Reserve Fund under Legislated Schedule Changes 
Having discussed the way in which fertility, mortality, productivity growth, 
and interest rates are modeled as stochastic processes, we are now ready to 
discuss the way  these are used to generate forecasts of the social security re- 
serve fund. We  do this through  stochastic simulation. Although it is conceiv- 
able  that  we  could  derive  an  analytic  solution  for  the  forecasts  and  their 
moments, as we  have done elsewhere for the population forecasts (Lee and 
Tuljapurkar 1994), that would be extremely difficult. Stochastic simulation is 
a straightforward and convenient method for arriving at results for particular 
models. 
The first step is to generate a large set of stochastic simulations of the popu- 
lation from the present to 2070, the end date of our forecasts. We have simu- 
lated 750 populations in this way. Our methods follow those in Lee and Tulja- 
purkar  (1994),  except  that  we  have  increased  the  migration  levels  to  the 
intermediate levels in SSA forecasts (Board of Trustees  1996) and have used 
the SSA initial population for midyear 1994 as the starting population. 
Figure 9.8 plots the 95 percent projection intervals for the old age depen- 
dency ratio, containing 95 percent of our simulated trajectories. Also plotted 409  Stochastic Forecasts for Social Security 
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Fig. 9.9  Projected total dependency ratios to 2070 with brackets 
Nure:  SSA brackets are high- and low-cost variants. Stochastic forecast brackets are 95 percent 
probability intervals. 
are the SSA 1992 and SSA 1996 projections and intervals (Board of Trustees 
1992, 1996). Their projections and ours are evidently quite similar, with our 
higher fertility assumption compensating for our lower mortality forecast. It is 
particularly interesting to note that the fixed scenarios used by the SSA gener- 
ate a range of dependency ratios that is almost as wide as the 95 percent inter- 
vals in the stochastic projection. 
Any comfort produced by the similarities in figure 9.8 is dispelled by figure 
9.9, which displays the total dependency ratio. Whereas the stochastic projec- 
tions again yield wide projection intervals in distant years, the SSA scenarios 
are very  close to each other throughout the 75-year forecast period. This re- 
markable closeness results from intrinsic contradictions in the scenario-based 
approach. In order to indicate what is construed to be an appropriate amount 
of uncertainty in the old age dependency ratio, the variable of prime concern 
to the SSA, low fertility and low mortality are combined in the high-cost sce- 
nario, and high fertility and high mortality in the low-cost scenario. But low 
fertility means few children, while low mortality means many elderly, so that 
when they are combined in the total dependency ratio, they offset one another. 
For this reason, the SSA high and low total dependency ratios are very close 
to one another. 
For each simulation, we also stochastically  simulate a trajectory for real 
productivity growth and another for interest rates. The productivity growth rate 410  Ronald Lee and Shripad Tuljapurkar 
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Ten stochastically simulated sample paths of the OASDI trust 
simulation is then used in the ways discussed to alter the tax and benefit pro- 
files, which are next applied to the population age distribution simulation for 
that  year. That generates  gross flows of payroll  taxes and benefit  payments. 
Additional inflows to the reserve fund come from the simulated interest rate 
times the reserve fund at midyear, plus revenues from income taxes on bene- 
fit~.~  Additional outflows are for administrative costs of the system, and of the 
separate railroad fund. The difference between total inflows and total outflows, 
the net flow, is added to the value of the reserve fund. In this way, the state of 
the system is updated each year, and the level of the reserve fund is calculated 
for one particular simulated sample path. This process is repeated for each of 
the 750 stochastic  simulations  of population, interest  rate, and productivity 
growth. Each simulation assumes that no policy action is taken to adjust tax or 
benefit rates in response to trends in the reserve fund. 
Figure 9.10 plots  10 randomly  chosen simulated  sample paths out of the 
total of 750.  These lines often cross one another, indicating that the same line 
is not always the best or always the worst, as would be the case under scenario- 
9. This procedure slightly exaggerates the influence of interest rate movements on the finances 
of the system in the short run, because once bonds are purchased by  the trust fund, the nominal 
interest rate is fixed for the life of  the bond. Subsequent fluctuations in the nominal rate will not 
affect the money earned on that bond. However, most of the volatility in the real interest rate series 
that we usc is due to variation in the rate of inflation. The rate of  inflation affects the real rate of 
return on bonds no matter when they were purchased, consistent with the specification we use. 411  Stochastic Forecasts for Social Security 
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Fig. 9.11  Projected balance of OASDI trust fund (1995 to 2025) with brackets 
from SSA and stochastic forecasts 
Note: SSA brackets are high- and low-cost variants. Stochastic forecast brackets are  95 percent 
probability intervals. 
based forecasting. Based on the full set of 750 (or a larger set of simulations if 
we wished) we can calculate the mean of  sample paths in each year, and we 
can also find for each year the level of the reserve fund that is greater than 97.5 
percent of the paths and the level that is greater than only 2.5 percent of the 
paths. These two levels then define the 95 percent probability band for each 
year. 
Figure 9.11 shows the forecast only for the first 30 years, up to 2025, for 
purposes of comparison to the SSA forecast. There are noticeable differences. 
Although we cannot see it, the simulated mean crosses the line of zero reserves 
in 2026, four years earlier than in SSA forecasts. The main message, however, 
is uncertainty about this crossing point: the 95 percent interval includes ex- 
haustion in 2014, as well as exhaustion in 2037, beyond the range of this plot. 
The level of the reserve fund peaks at $1.3 trillion on average, but the upper 
bound peaks at $4.0 trillion, and the lower bound at only $0.57 trillion, not 
much more than it is now. 
Figure 9.12 shows the mean and 95 percent probability band for the forecast 
of the reserve fund, now all the way out to 2070. Because we have not modeled 
any economic or policy feedbacks and the forecasted fund debt becomes enor- 
mous, these forecasts should not be taken at face value. The debt could not 
actually grow so large without serious consequences for the economy, which 412  Ronald Lee and Shripad 'hljapurkar 
0  0 
8 
LD  I  I  I  I 
2000  2020  2040  2060 
Date 
Projected balance of OASDI trust fund (1995 to 2070) with brackets  Fig. 9.12 
from stochastic forecast 
Note: Stochastic forecast brackets (solid lines) are 95 percent probability intervals. 
would in turn cause changes in interest rates and productivity growth, or lead 
to policy changes in taxes or benefits. 
In figure 9.12, the mean fund balance dips to a debt of $26 trillion by 2070 
(all dollars are expressed in  1996 U.S. dollars). The 95 percent range spans 
debts in 2070 of $6 to $60 trillion. The SSA only publishes fund projections 
for trajectories above zero, but their low-cost forecast for the fund in 2070 is a 
positive $9 trillion dollars-a  more optimistic projection than ours, despite our 
assumed expected TFR of  2.1. The most important message from this plot is 
not the trend in the mean, which should not be far different from other fore- 
casts of the same quantity. The important message is rather the great deal of 
uncertainty surrounding the mean forecast, and the explicit quantification of 
the probabilities. 
We do not, in fact, mean to suggest that the trust fund will actually go to 
zero, let alone to debts of trillions of dollars. As the fund begins to fall toward 
zero, action will be taken to raise the tax schedule, reduce benefits, delay retire- 
ment, further tax benefits, invest the reserves in equities yielding higher returns 
than government bonds, privatize the system, or in some other way prevent the 
system from going into debt. These forecasts, conditional on the future tax and 
benefit rules conforming to current plans, are rather intended to shed light on 
the consequences of those plans. Section 9.5 takes up a different kind of calcu- 
lation that we believe to be more interesting. 413  Stochastic Forecasts for Social Security 
Table 9.1  Summary Actuarial Balance According to SSA and the Current 
Model (percentage increase in payroll tax rate necessary to restore 
actuarial balance) 
Summary Actuarial Balance, by  Period 
Source of Projection  1995-2020  1995-2045  1995-2070 
SSA 1996  .36  -1.39  -2.19 
LT:  SSA mortality and fertility, deterministic  32  -1.28  -2.31 
LT SSA mortality, TFR = 2.1, deterministic  .82  -  1.25  -2.14 
LT: LC mortality, TFR = 2.1, stochastic  .50  -2.00  -3.33 
Notes: In deterministic simulations, the discount rate is 2.3 percent; in the stochastic simulation, 
the discount rate for each sample path is the corresponding simulated rate. “SSA mortality” corre- 
sponds to life expectancy of 80.7 years in 2070; “LC mortality,” for Lee and Carter (1992) mortal- 
ity, corresponds to life expectancy of 86.1 years in 2070. “SSA fertility” corresponds to TFR = 
1.9. In our simulations, SSA mortality is a mortality trajectory calculated using the Lee-Carter 
model, but with an imposed rate of decline resulting in the SSA life expectancy level in  2070. 
Details of the age pattern of decline and the timing of decline differ from SSA assumptions. 
9.5  Long-Term Actuarial Balance and Tax Increases 
The SSA employs a summarized measure of the long-term status of the trust 
funds, based on what are called summarized cost rates and summarized income 
rates. The basic measure, the long-term actuarial balance, is roughly speaking 
equal to the difference between the present value of the stream of tax revenues 
and benefit payments over the projection period, divided by the present value 
of the stream of total payroll. It can be interpreted as the amount by which the 
payroll  tax rate  would  have to be  raised, immediately  and permanently,  to 
equalize these two present values, taking into account the existing reserve fund 
at the start and the target reserve fund at the end. We will use the SSA calcula- 
tions of actuarial balance as a kind  of  benchmark  against which  to test the 
long-term performance of our model. We will also use this measure as a conve- 
nient  metric for representing the relative importance of  different sources of 
uncertainty in our stochastic forecasts. 
Table 9.1 reports on the calculated summary actuarial balance based on four 
different models and for each of  the four shows the calculated balance over 
three different periods. The first row reports the balance according to the SSA 
(Board of Trustees  1996). This report concludes that the system would be in 
balance through 2070 if the payroll tax rate were immediately and permanently 
raised from 12.4 percent (for OASDI) to 14.59 percent (= 12.4 + 2.19). We 
attempt to replicate this result by running a deterministic simulation in which 
TFR is set at the SSA level of 1.9  children per woman and mortality is assumed 
to decline at a constant rate (distributed by age according to the Lee and Carter, 
1992, model) such as to achieve the SSA projected life expectancy in 2070. 
Interest rates and productivity growth rates are assumed fixed at the SSA levels 
of 2.3 percent and 1 percent. The result is shown in the second row, resulting 
in a figure of  -2.31  versus  -2.19,  which we view  as excellent  agreement, 414  Ronald Lee and Shripad nljapurkar 
given our very different approach to projecting the tax and benefits schedules. 
Additional experiments, not reported here, show that deterministic sensitivity 
analyses using our model yield results very similar to those reported by SSA. 
The third row of  table 9.1 shows another deterministic simulation, which 
differs from the previous one only in that TFR is now  set at 2.1, as in Lee 
and Tuljapurkar (1994). The agreement with SSA is very slightly worse in the 
medium term, but somewhat closer in the long term. Finally, the last row shows 
the mean result from the set of  stochastic simulations, this time with TFR = 
2.1 and mortality  declining at the faster pace of  Lee and Carter (1992), re- 
sulting in roughly twice the gain in life expectancy projected by the SSA. Be- 
cause of this more rapid mortality decline, the actuarial balance for 1995-2070 
is now -3.33,  or about 1.2 percent worse than with the SSA mortality. 
The SSA (Board of Trustees 1996,23) gives a range for this summary actu- 
arial balance from +.46 percent to -5.67  percent, with an interval width of 
6.13 percent (= .46 + 5.67). The standard deviation of our stochastic summary 
actuarial balance is 1.58 percent, leading to a 95 percent probability interval 
ranging from -.17  percent to -6.49  percent, for an interval width of 6.3 per- 
cent, very  similar to the SSA's. This indicates that the SSA's  low-cost-high- 
cost range for 2070 has an approximate 95 percent probability  coverage, as- 
suming it  is correctly centered. However, our interval  is centered at  -3.33, 
versus  -2.19  for theirs, a fairly substantial difference. The difference arises 
from the more rapid mortality decline in the stochastic simulation. 
9.6  Fund Exhaustion and Tax Increase 
According to the SSA projections, a 2.19 percent increase in the OASDI tax 
rate should restore the system to long-term balance, under the intermediate set 
of  assumptions. We  can use our stochastic simulation (as reported in the last 
row of table 9.1) to assess the likelihood that exhaustion would occur in any 
case. Panel A of figure 9.13 shows the probability distribution of  dates of ex- 
haustion of the OASDI trust fund if taxes were immediately raised by  1 per- 
cent, to 13.4 percent. In this case, 93.4 percent of the sample paths reach fund 
exhaustion before the end of the period in 2070, and the median fund balance 
in 2070 is -$17  trillion (1996 dollars). Panel B shows the corresponding prob- 
ability distribution  assuming an immediate 2 percent increase in the tax rate, 
to  14.4 percent. In this case, three-quarters  of  the sample paths still end in 
exhaustion by 2070, and the median fund balance then is -$8  trillion. 
We  could search for the permanent tax increase necessary to achieve a 95 
percent probability  of nonexhaustion by 2070. However, the requirement that 
there be no subsequent tinkering with taxes and benefits to achieve balance in 
the future, as more is learned about actual demographic and economic develop- 
ments, is unappealingly rigid. Instead we pursue a different approach, going 
to the opposite extreme of adjusting taxes on a year-by-year basis to meet costs. 415  Stochastic Forecasts for Social Security 
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Fig. 9.13  Histograms of  dates of exhaustion 
9.7  Forecasts of the Payroll Tax Rate under Reserve Fund Constraints 
Suppose that instead of fixing a tax rate to hold for the next 75 years, we set 
the tax rate each year to maintain the reserve fund at a level exactly sufficient 
to cover one year’s benefit payments? We can do this calculation in two ways. 
One is to leave the currently legislated  12.4 percent tax rate in place until the 
reserve falls to 100 percent of anticipated year-ahead outflows and thereafter 
raise or lower the tax rate as necessary to leave the reserve at this level. We call 
this “eventual pay as you go.” The other way is to let the reserve fund immedi- 
ately fall to 100 percent of outflow (which takes only a couple of years of zero 
or very low taxes) and thereafter adjust it as necessary. This approach gives us 
the pure PAYGO rate. 
We present results only for the first calculation, eventual PAYGO. We hold 
constant the 12.4 percent rate until the reserve fund drops to the target level. 
The results are shown in figure 9.14, which plots lines giving varying probabil- 
ity  coverages. For example,  in any year, 60 percent  of  the  sample lines lie 
below the line labeled .6. The median line (not shown) would lie roughly half- 
way  between the .4 and .6 lines. It would remain at 12.4 percent until 2022, 
rise rapidly as the baby boom retires, and then rise more slowly to 24 percent 
in 2070. The lines labeled  ,025 and .975 bound  the region with 95 percent 
probability coverage. The lower .025 bound remains at 12.4 percent until 2043 416  Ronald Lee and Shripad Tuljapurkar 
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Fig. 9.14  Tax rate for year-ahead balance (distribution by selected quantiles) 
and then rises modestly to 16 percent in 2070. The upper 97.5 percent bound 
rises roughly linearly after 2003, to 34 percent in 2070. 
In sum, with the eventual PAYGO system with variable tax rates the median 
tax rate would double by 2070 and still be rising slowly at that point, reflecting 
continuing mortality  decline. There is a 2.5 percent chance that the tax rate 
would have to rise to 34 percent of earnings by the end of the forecast in 2070. 
A 34 percent payroll tax rate, plus additional taxes for Medicare and Medicaid, 
plus other state, local, and federal taxes, would be a terribly heavy burden. 
These results may be compared to annual cost estimates by the SSA (Board 
of Trustees 1996, 170-71)  for 2070, which gives a high-medium-low range of 
28.0, 18.8, and 13.1 percent, respectively. The range widths are again similar: 
15 percent for SSA versus 18 percent for the stochastic simulation, indicating 
that the SSA probability coverage would be somewhat less than 95 percent if 
the range were correctly centered. However, the stochastic simulation gives a 
median tax in 2070 of 24 percent, versus  18.8 percent for the SSA. The in- 
crease from the initial tax of 12.4 percent is nearly twice as great in the stochas- 
tic simulation as in the SSA projection. This difference arises from the more 
rapid decline in mortality incorporated in the stochastic simulation. 
9.8  How Much Uncertainty Does Each Component Contribute? 
We have seen that there is a great deal of  uncertainty about the long-term 
finances of the system. Where does this uncertainty originate? What would we 417  Stochastic Forecasts for Social Security 
Table 9.2  Sources of Uncertainty in Forecasts of Summary Actuarial Balance 
(standard errors when one variable at a time is stochastic) 
Standard Error of Summary Actuarial Balance, 
by Period 
Stochastic Variable  1995-2020  1995-2045  1995-2070 
Fertility  .02  .21  .86 
Mortality  .19  .39  .54 
Productivity growth rate  .90  .90  .80 
Fertility and mortality  .I9  .48  1.02 
Interest rate  .I4  SO  .69 
All  .93  1.18  1.58 
Note; The discount rate is 2.3 percent, except when the interest rate is stochastic, in which case 
the simulated trajectory of interest rates is used for each sample path. 
need to know to reduce it? The Board of Trustees (1996) reports a sensitivity 
analysis for its forecasts, showing the effect on the long-run balance of  the 
system when one factor varies across the specified high-low range, while hold- 
ing all others at their mean values. The outcome, of  course, depends on the 
sensitivity of the projection to each variable, but it also depends on the amount 
of change that is examined for each variable-the  width of the range. We can 
avoid arbitrary assumptions about this range by using our stochastic simulation 
model. Holding all but one of the variables (fertility, mortality, interest rates, 
and productivity  growth rates) fixed at their mean trajectories,  we allow the 
fourth to vary stochastically in the usual way. The resulting widths of the prob- 
ability bands can then be compared. Results of this exercise are reported in 
table 9.2, which gives the standard deviation of the summary actuarial balance 
in each case, for each of three time periods. 
From the last column of the table, we see that fertility contributes the great- 
est uncertainty  through 2070, followed by  the productivity  growth rate, the 
interest rate, and finally mortality. It is striking that whereas our model puts 
uncertainty  about mortality  lust in importance, the SSA analysis (Board of 
Trustees 1996, 132-34)  puts it$m And whereas we put fertility$rsr  in impor- 
tance, the SSA puts it lust (tied with the interest rate). 
It is also interesting to note how the relative and absolute contributions to 
uncertainty  change with the period over which actuarial balance is assessed. 
Fertility makes only a trivial contribution over the period 1995-2020  because 
there is a long lag between birth and labor force entry, while the productivity 
growth rate makes by far the strongest contribution over this period. Interest 
does not matter much because the trust fund is not very large, and mortality, 
which operates cumulatively  on survival rates, has insufficient time to make 
much difference. 
The fifth row of the table shows the standard deviation of the actuarial bal- 
ance when both fertility and mortality  are stochastic but the economic vari- 418  Ronald Lee and Shripad Tuljapurkar 
ables are fixed, and the last row gives the result  when all four variables are 
stochastic. Comparing  these,  we  see that  over  the  25-year  horizon,  demo- 
graphic uncertainty  generates a standard deviation only one-fifth as wide as 
the fully stochastic model. However, over a 75-year horizon, demographic un- 
certainty alone generates a standard deviation almost two-thirds as wide as the 
fully stochastic model. Evidently, demographic uncertainty becomes far more 
important over the long run than it is over the shorter run. 
9.9  Conclusion 
We are still developing the methods used for these stochastic simulations, 
and there will doubtless be future changes. Nonetheless, this macrosimulation 
model replicates quite closely the key SSA results, when run in deterministic 
mode using SSA assumptions. This confirms that the basic simulation model 
is mechanically  sound. Most of the material we present is based on stochastic 
models of fertility, mortality, interest rates, and productivity growth rates, with 
expected values that conform closely  to the SSA intermediate assumptions. 
The exception  is mortality, for which we believe the  SSA projected  rate of 
decline is too  slow. Our fitted  stochastic mortality  model  foresees twice as 
great gains in life expectancy by the year 2070 as do the SSA projections. 
We  considered long-term stochastic projections of  the trust fund balance, 
the summary actuarial balance, and the PAYGO tax rate. Because we do not 
incorporate economic or policy feedbacks in our model, outcomes in which 
large positive or negative trust fund balances occur are bound to be quite unre- 
alistic. With that caveat, our 95 percent probability intervals for 2070 were as 
follows: for the trust fund, in 1996 dollars, -$6  to -$60  trillion; for the sum- 
mary actuarial balance,  -.2  to -6.5  percent of  the present value of payroll; 
and for the  PAYGO  balanced  budget tax rate  in 2070,  16 to 34 percent  of 
payroll. 
Because of  the more rapid expected rate of  mortality  decline used in  our 
stochastic simulations, our financial projections are somewhat more pessimis- 
tic than those of the SSA. For example, our expected summary actuarial bal- 
ance is  -3.33  percent of  the present value of  payroll, versus  -2.19  for the 
Board of Trustees (1996). However, the width of the SSA high-cost-low-cost 
ranges, to which no probability interpretation is attached, are surprisingly close 
to the width of our 95 percent probability intervals, when compared for hori- 
zons of 2020, 2045, and 2070. These widths are much greater than the differ- 
ences in  means between  the  stochastic simulation projections  and  the  SSA 
projections, which is reassuring. 
According to our simulations, if currently legislated tax and benefit rates are 
unchanged, there is a 95 percent chance of trust fund exhaustion between 2014 
and 2037. There is only a 2.5 percent  chance that the trust fund balance in 
2070 will exceed -$6  trillion (1996 dollars). If the tax rate were immediately 
and permanently raised by 1 percent, there would still be a 92 percent probabil- 419  Stochastic Forecasts for Social Security 
ity of trust fund exhaustion before 2070. If the tax were raised by 2 percent, 
close to the 2.19 percent that the SSA suggests would be needed to achieve 
long-term balance, we find that there would still be a 75 percent chance that 
the trust fund would be exhausted before 2070. 
We have also computed the implicit rate of return that the generation born in 
1980-84,  and therefore just about to enter the labor force, will receive through 
OASDI. We project an expected real rate of  return of  1.6 percent, with a 95 
percent probability interval of .2 to 2.8 percent. 
When we examined the relative contributions of our four stochastic factors 
to uncertainty  in the projections,  the results disagreed sharply with the SSA 
sensitivity analysis. For example, we found fertility to be by far the greatest 
source of uncertainty about the long-run finances of the system, while the SSA 
found it to be least important. We found mortality to be least important in the 
long run, while the SSA found it to be most important. Our results also showed 
clearly that demography matters most in the long run,  where its tidal forces 
have a cumulative impact. 
We  are still at early stages of digesting our stochastic  forecasts of  the fi- 
nances of the social security system and are still exploring new ways in which 
these forecasts and experiments might be useful and informative. One promis- 
ing use, not yet implemented, will be to test the consequences of  a range of 
strategies and policy options for dealing with uncertainty. Is it better to wait 
and see, adjusting policy continuously as we gain information? Or is it better 
to accumulate large reserves early on, to provide a buffer against unlikely but 
possible transitory  insults to the  system? Or should policy  simply be set to 
deal reasonably with the mean trajectory, ignoring the uncertainty? How about 
keying the level of benefits to life expectancy at retirement, as in the Swedish 
system, or tying cohort benefit levels to cohort fertility, as has sometimes been 
suggested? Stochastic simulations could provide a useful laboratory for testing 
these alternative policies in relation  to goals such as achieving intergenera- 
tional equity, avoiding rapid changes in taxes or benefits, and keeping the trust 
fund above zero. 
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Comment  Sylvester J. Schieber 
The basic premise in Ronald Lee and Shripad Tuljapurkar’s (hereafter L-T) 
paper is that the planning surrounding major government entitlement commit- 
ments in general, and social security in particular, must not only take into ac- 
count our best estimates about the future costs and cost drivers of these pro- 
grams but also must consider the uncertainty surrounding those estimates. On 
the basis of this premise, they develop a set of stochastic forecasts of the future 
operations of social security. 
L-T’s  approach to  forecasting  social  security operations in the paper has 
been supported by various groups in the past, including some in advisory roles 
to the Social Security Administration (SSA). For example, the Technical Panel 
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on Assumptions and Methods that supported the 1994-96  Social Security Ad- 
visory Council recommended the “implementation of stochastic analysis pro- 
cedures for presenting and evaluating the uncertainty in OASDI projections” 
(Technical Panel 1996, 137). Following on the recommendations of the Tech- 
nical Panel, the Advisory Council itself recommended  that such “modeling 
should be used as a tool for recognizing explicitly the uncertainty surrounding 
the . . .  demographic and economic assumptions” used in valuing the program’s 
operations (Advisory Council 1997, 22). 
While the approach that L-T have recommended and the analysis that they 
have done may receive relatively widespread support among policy analysts in 
general, it is still a debated approach within social insurance policy analysis 
circles, and it is not a path that has been taken by the social security program’s 
actuaries in developing official cost estimates. Robert J. Myers, former chief 
actuary of the SSA, believes that the deterministic scenario-based modeling 
that is currently used in projecting social security operations is adequate and 
that the high-  and low-cost estimates  give a reasonable  range of  costs that 
might be expected under the program. 
Myers has laid out a rationale for continued use of  the deterministic ap- 
proach and makes three points to support it. First, he believes that “experi- 
enced judgment” is superior to “blind mathematical analysis of  past experi- 
ence” in  developing  these  estimates. Second,  he  believes  that  the  present 
practice of lumping together the low-cost (high-cost) assumptions to develop 
low-cost (high-cost) program projections  produces  a reasonable  “range” of 
cost estimates in the aggregate. Third, he argues that “any large changes . . . 
should be phased in over a period of years, so that there is a reasonable cer- 
tainty that they should be made in their entirety” (Technical Panel 1996, 267- 
68). In the last point, it is not clear whether Myers is arguing that changes in 
assumptions should be phased in slowly or whether changes in program costs 
should be recognized on a phased basis. To a certain extent, phasing in changes 
in assumptions over a period of annual valuations will result in the slow recog- 
nition of  changing cost estimates. Regardless of  his precise meaning on the 
third point, Myers’s arguments for staying with the current valuation methodol- 
ogy offer a framework for reviewing the work reported in L-T’s paper. 
Accuracy of Prior Estimates 
One way to judge the quality of the current approach to projecting social 
security costs or whether it might be desirable to move to a stochastic modeling 
approach is to review prior projections to see how they have comported with 
ultimate experience. In this regard, the results are mixed. Estimates of OASI 
program costs developed by  the program’s actuaries after the passage of  the 
1939 amendments to the Social Security Act projected the cost of  OASI in 
1970 at 6.33 percent of covered payroll based on “original assumptions” and 
at 8.54 percent of  payroll based on “probable maximum cost assumptions.” 
The respective projections for 1980 were 7.21 percent and  10.60 percent of 422  Ronald Lee and Shripad Tuljapurkar 
covered payroll (Bronson 1939). The actual cost of OASI benefit payments in 
1970 was 6.98 percent of covered payroll (Board of  Trustees  1971), and in 
1980 it was 9.39 percent (Board of Trustees 1981). 
Based on this evidence, it seems the early estimates of long-term program 
costs were  reasonable  predictions  of  the ultimate  tax  burden  to  support it. 
While the SSA’s actuaries likely never dreamed of the rapid expansion of bene- 
fits during the 1970s, their 1939 “maximum probable cost” estimate for 1980 
still bounded the actual cost of the program. The early history of the program 
and its related cost projections, however, might not be instructive for the future 
that we now face. It seems there was a general sense among the early advocates 
of  social security that the economy and the public would or could bear cost 
rates up to 12 percent of covered payroll. The managers of the program were 
fully cognizant that costs would rise over time as a growing share of the work- 
ing population attained “insured”  status under the program. Over the years, 
benefits were increased repeatedly but always within the constraints that esti- 
mated  cost rates  allowed.  In this  environment, the  1939 cost projection  for 
1970 became a self-fulfilling prophecy. It was accepted from the earliest days 
of the program as being a reasonable cost, and benefit levels were merely ad- 
justed periodically  to move toward it. The target cost rate could be achieved 
without being exceeded because the program was run on a nominal basis. If 
costs started to get out of hand, inflationary forces could bring them back into 
line with acceptable rates. This all changed with the  1972 amendments that 
automatically indexed benefits and resulted in the double indexing of  initial 
benefit awards for new beneficiaries.  These amendments made the program 
particularly susceptible to price inflation, especially to the extent that it sig- 
nificantly exceeded the rate of growth of wages. 
Social Security has always been run largely on a pay-as-you-go basis. Under 
such a financing regime, revenues must roughly equal expenditures from year 
to year. In simple mathematical terms, 
where t is the payroll tax rate, N, the number of workers who are covered by 
the system, W their average covered wages, N, the number of beneficiaries, and 
B their average benefit levels. Stated in another way, 
where the ratio of beneficiaries to workers can be thought of as the dependency 
ratio and the ratio of benefits to wages might be thought of as the benefits ratio 
or, in the parlance of retirement plans, the system’s average wage replacement 
level. 
Table 9C.1 compares the midrange economic  assumptions used in devel- 
oping the SSA’s cost projections for the  1972 Board of  Trustees report  with 
actual experience for the five years from  1972 through 1976. As a result of the 423  Stochastic Forecasts for Social Security 
Table 9C.1  Comparison of Five-Year Economic Assumptions in the 1972 OASDl 
Trustees Report with Actual Experience 
Unemployment 
CPI Increase (a)  Real Wage Increase (%)  Rate (%) 
Year  Assumed"  Actual  Assumed"  Actual  Assumed"  Actual 
1972  2.75  3.3  2.25  4.0  4.2  5.6 
1973  2.75  6.2  2.25  0.7  4.2  4.9 
1974  2.75  11.0  2.25  -3.6  4.2  5.6 
1975  2.75  9.1  2.25  -2.5  4.2  8.5 
1976  2.75  5.8  2.25  2.5  4.2  7.7 
Total  14.53  40.6  11.77  1  .o  4.2b  6.5b 
Sources: 1972 Annual Report of  the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance 
and Disability Insurance Trust Funds (Washington, D.C.:  Government Printing Office, 1972) and Eco- 
nomic Report of the President (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1982). 
"Midrange  assumptions. 
bEstimates for five-year unemployment totals and five-year averages 
1972 social security amendments and what was going on in the economy at 
the time, benefits absolutely exploded relative to wage levels, and the benefi- 
ciary-to-worker ratio was adversely affected by the higher than expected un- 
employment levels. There was a clear breakdown in the reliability of the cost 
estimation process at this point in social security's history. It is conceivable that 
stochastic modeling would have helped catch the problems introduced in the 
1972 amendments  before  their passage, but  it is  also quite possible that  it 
would not have. 
The 1977 social security amendments were intended to bring benefits back 
into line with their more traditional levels and to stabilize the relationship be- 
tween benefits and wages looking forward, subject to the variations noted by 
L-T in their analysis. The 1977 amendments proved to be insufficient to deal 
with the continuing adverse economic conditions of  the late 1970s and early 
1980s, and the program had to be rebalanced once again in the  1983 amend- 
ments. The actuaries'  projections after the adoption of the 1983 changes pre- 
dicted that the trust fund balances would accumulate to more than $20 trillion 
but would ultimately be depleted in 2063 (Ballantyne 1983). Subsequent pro- 
jections  in the annual Board of  Trustees reports have consistently ratcheted 
down the trust fund accumulation, with the latest projection that it would only 
accumulate  about $2.8  trillion  at its  peak  and  would  be  depleted by  2029 
(Board of Trustees 1997). The 1997 intermediate projection actually turned out 
to be somewhat less optimistic than the pessimistic projection from 1983. 
The point of this discussion is that since social security has matured and the 
benefit structure been indexed, the cost projections for the program have be- 
come somewhat more sensitive to economic and demographic variations than 
they had been in the past. Recent projections have suggested an unwarranted 424  Ronald Lee and Shripad Tuljapurkar 
level of certainty about future costs that have often proved to be badly out of 
range, and “worst case” scenarios have proved to be optimistic. In short, the 
projection game has changed, and the old methods no longer seem adequate to 
the task of providing realistic cost estimates in some cases, or a sense of the 
vulnerability of those estimates to varying experience under the program. 
Stochastic Projections versus Reliance on Experienced Judgment 
In  Myers’s defense of the current SSA projection  methods he argues that 
the “experienced judgment” behind current projections  is better than “blind 
mathematical analysis” of the past. The implication is that stochastic modeling 
necessarily relies solely on mindless projection of past trends with the histori- 
cal variation around those trends built into the projections that are being devel- 
oped. The work by L-T shows that this does not have to be the case. For several 
of  the important  variables  used  in  determining social security’s long-term 
costs, L-T constrain their projections to mean distributions that are equivalent 
or close to the best-guess estimates used by the SSA actuaries in their long- 
term projections. 
However, the results of the L-T stochastic simulations raise a question about 
the superiority of such projections over the current scenario-based determinis- 
tic projections that are formally used in monitoring and projecting social secu- 
rity  operations. For example, the close correspondence  between  the L-T 95 
percent probability intervals for the aged dependency ratios and those gener- 
ated in the high- and low-cost projections developed by the SSA actuaries sug- 
gests a similar correspondence in long-term cost projections, given the impor- 
tance of this dependency ratio in determining costs, as shown in equation (2) 
above. Indeed, L-T report that the range of their cost estimates from 95 percent 
probability levels corresponds closely to the range in the low- and high-cost 
estimates published by the Board of Trustees. L-T’s costs are generally higher 
than those from the SSA largely because of the difference in their assumptions 
about continued improvements in life expectancy. Earlier work by Ronald Lee 
and Lawrence  Carter  (1994)  supports the contention  that  the SSA is being 
overly optimistic in its assumptions about future life expectancy-that  is, it is 
assuming slower increases in life expectancy than many demographers think 
is reasonable. The Technical Panel for the 1994-96 Advisory Council was very 
critical of the assumptions being used by the SSA in its projections (Technical 
Panel 1996,251-62). 
The criticism that current formal SSA projections are not based on proper 
assumptions does not necessarily mean that the actuaries’ current cost projec- 
tion methods are inferior to a stochastic approach. But this issue of appropriate 
assumptions  cuts directly  against  the first of  the  points  that  Robert  Myers 
makes in arguing for the current projection methodology over stochastic mod- 
eling of the future. If  we are to rely on the “experienced judgment” of those 
doing projections,  no matter what their method of projecting  that judgment 
should not blindly ignore the past unless there is a powerful reason for doing 425  Stochastic Forecasts for Social Security 
Fig. 9C.1 
percentage of covered payroll over projection years 1983-95 
Source: US.  Department of  the Treasury, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Economic Policy. 
Changes in 75-year estimated OASDI actuarial balance as a 
so. If the actuaries were using stochastic projection techniques, it is likely that 
they would use more formal processes in projecting important variables such 
as life expectancy than they seem to be using now. They would also have to 
provide a much better rationale than they do now in relying on their “experi- 
enced judgment” when such judgment goes against historical trends. 
Projecting a Reasonable Range of Outcomes 
Robert  Myers’s  second  argument  for the  SSA’s  staying  with  its  current 
method of projecting future OASDI costs is that the scenarios project a reason- 
able range of cost estimates. As noted  earlier, the L-T range of projections 
starting from a base year of  1995 does correspond closely with those of  the 
SSA actuaries. While the range of the two sets of projections may be relatively 
close, another way to consider the variance in the projections from the respec- 
tive models is to look at how they might be used in choosing public policies 
and whether the two approaches would lead to different potential conclusions. 
The last time that we undertook a major review of SSA policies that led to 
significant policy changes was in 1983. After the 1983 social security amend- 
ments were adopted, the program actuaries estimated that the program would 
be in actuarial balance-that  is, aggregate revenues plus assets would equal 
aggregate expenditures-for  the next 75 years. Over the years since then, the 
annual projections of the system have consistently estimated larger and larger 
actuarial  deficits  for the  program.  Figure  9C.1  summarizes,  by  reason  of 
change, the changes in projected actuarial balances under the formal projec- 
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A natural question that arises from figure 9C.  1 is whether the evolution of 
SSA projections between  1983 and  1995 would have been any different in a 
stochastic modeling  world  than  under  the  deterministic  process  now  used. 
While it is impossible to be certain, there is some likelihood that the actuaries 
would have used similar economic and demographic assumptions whether they 
were doing stochastic or deterministic projections. Beyond the economic and 
demographic assumptions (Econ and Demo), both models would likely have 
been plagued by similar experiences. The costs attributed to changing methods 
(Methods) relate to the discovery  of  calculation  errors or different ways of 
looking at cost calculations. The change in costs attributed to differences in 
valuation year (Val Yr) are related  to doing 75-year forecasts and the demo- 
graphic structure of  the population; namely, each year we give up one good 
year in the projection and add a bad one. The cost changes attributed to disabil- 
ity relate to growing incidence rates of such benefits, and it is not clear that 
explicit modeling of disability on a stochastic basis would have anticipated 
these increases any more quickly than the actuaries have. L-T are not explicitly 
stochastically modeling disability at this time, but given the sensitivity of cost 
estimates to these claims, it would seem like a valuable  addition to make to 
the program. 
Given the close correspondence between the L-T and SSA aged dependency 
ratios noted earlier, the significant divergence in total dependency ratios under 
the two projection methods is curious. It is easy to understand why L-T would 
get greater variance in total dependency than the SSA actuaries. The latter, in 
their low-cost estimates, pair high fertility rates with low improvements in life 
expectancy, and in their high-cost estimates, pair low fertility rates with high 
improvements in life expectancy. In some of L-T’s simulations, high fertility 
rates get paired  with high improvements in life expectancy resulting in high 
total dependency rates, a situation that never arises in the actuaries’ determinis- 
tic projections.  The larger variance in the total dependency ratio in the L-T 
stochastic projections results from the underlying variations in fertility rates in 
their alternative simulations. But conventional wisdom suggests that the high- 
fertility  scenarios, which would initially drive up the total dependency ratio, 
should ultimately drive down the aged dependency ratio as the greater number 
of children being born under the scenario age and enter the workforce. The 
inconsistency  in  the  results  in  these two dependency  ratios  either  deserves 
more analysis or more explanation. 
Clearly, stochastic projection  models can produce ranges of  estimates for 
programs like social security that are as much within the boundaries of reason- 
able expectations as the models that are currently being used. They have the 
possible added benefit that they give a new perspective on how variations in 
various demographic or economic variables can drive overall program costs. 
L-T raise this issue in their analysis of the comparative sensitivity of cost esti- 
mates  to  variations  in  fertility,  mortality,  productivity  growth,  and  interest 427  Stochastic Forecasts for Social Security 
rates, although they  do not fully explain why their stochastic results  are so 
different from those generated by deterministic projections. 
Modeling and Implementing Policy Changes 
It is not clear what Robert Myers meant when he wrote in support of the 
current  projection  methodology  used  by  the  SSA that  “large  changes  . . . 
should be phased in” gradually. Certainly it makes sense to implement signifi- 
cant policy changes on a phased basis in many cases. It makes no sense, how- 
ever, to phase in our understanding of the financial obligations that our entitle- 
ment programs present and the uncertainties associated with those obligations 
for our citizens in the future. Policymakers and citizens alike should under- 
stand the implications of current policy as soon as policy analysts have relative 
confidence in their own understanding of these programs. 
One of the problems in developing public policy estimates that are bounded 
by degrees of uncertainty  is that policymakers do not like uncertainty. When 
a problem arises, they want to be able to solve it, or at least to adopt policy 
changes that they can describe to their constituents as solving it. When social 
security was in financial crisis in the early 1980s, the deterministic model al- 
lowed policymakers to claim that they had solved the problem by adopting the 
1983 amendments because the actuaries’ projections showed that they had, It 
is not clear how the same policies would have been greeted under the headline 
“Congress Adopts Changes That Have a 60 Percent Probability of Solving the 
Social Security Financing Problem.” In retrospect, the public probably would 
have been better off if something like that had been the message, but putting 
probability  distributions on policy  prescriptions may further complicate the 
process of policy making itself. 
We are now at a point in the evolution of our public entitlement programs 
that there is a fairly widespread  consensus  that  they  are  seriously  underfi- 
nanced. The sense of concern about these programs has reached the point that 
policy analysts are now making proposals to reform them in ways that hereto- 
fore were never seriously considered. Many of the proposals that are now being 
put on the table would likely have significant effects on the economy that go 
beyond the rebalancing of the entitlement programs themselves. 
Possibly the greatest weakness of  the deterministic model used to project 
social security’s costs is its relative inability to consider feedback effects that 
relate to OASDI’s overall effects on the economy. Currently, the L-T model 
suffers from the same problem.  In their conclusion the authors note that one 
potential use of their stochastic model is testing policy options in the context 
of our ability to limit uncertainty under the programs and proposals to reform 
them. L-T are absolutely correct in their assessment of the potential usefulness 
of these kinds of models, but before their model can be used in this way,  it 
must be able to consider feedback effects. They note in the presentation of 
their results that some of the scenarios they estimate with the current model 428  Ronald Lee and Shripad Tuljapurkar 
are implausible because the trust fund deficits become so large that they would 
undoubtedly have implications for the larger economy. Many of  the solutions 
for the current underfunding of  social security anticipate significant increases 
in trust fund or savings levels that would also have significant macroeconomic 
effects. These must ultimately be considered in the testing of policy options. 
Social security is not the only program around which the issues raised by 
L-T in this paper might be considered. Under the actuaries’ midrange projec- 
tions, social security benefit claims are expected to rise from around 4.5 per- 
cent of GDP today to about 6.5 percent of GDP by 2030. Comparable projec- 
tions for Medicare would have its claims rising from around 2.5 percent of 
GDP today to 7.5 percent of GDP by 2030. In reviewing the assumptions used 
in making this projection, the Medicare actuaries are assuming that the exces- 
sive inflation that has plagued  this program from its outset will somehow be 
ameliorated around 2010. Beyond that, they assume the rate of growth in costs 
beyond pure demographic effects will be at the rate of  growth in the economy. 
In other words, Medicare’s actuaries are assuming a significant reduction of 
inflation in this  sector of  the economy just as the baby boomers make their 
largest claims on Medicare and the health delivery system. The uncertainties 
and risks associated with Medicare far outweigh those in social security and 
are deserving of the kind of scrutiny that L-T are advocating in their paper. 
This work by Ronald Lee and Shripad Tuljapurkar is a good beginning in 
helping us to understand some of the uncertainty surrounding social security 
cost projections.  The authors should be encouraged to continue the develop- 
ment of their model and to apply it to other public programs. 
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